Chaos As Strategy US Army War College | 379b5b8d94bc422930d4078d692b2b9

Nuclear Weapons and Strategy

The primary research question for this study is whether the US can use the concept of system shock to better operate in the Gray Zone. ‘System shock’ combines ideas from systems theory, chaos theory, and complexity theory to the ideas of bifurcation and operational shock. System shock is an archetype for military operations that focuses on bifurcating any opposing system to achieve operational shock. This monograph argues that system shock provides military leaders and planners with a framework to fight and win in Gray Zone environments and that this concept nests within the Unified Land Operations (ULO) doctrine by秉持着三条原则。第一条是：在系统阴影下实现系统冲击。第二条是：构建和解。治疗者的目的是恢复系统的秩序和平衡。第三条是：在系统阴影下实现系统冲击。这个概念在军事学中属于系统冲击理论。系统冲击是通过影响和改变敌方的系统，使其崩溃或失灵，从而实现战略目标。系统冲击理论在战略学中是一个重要的概念，对理解和分析现代战争具有重要价值。系统冲击的概念强调了系统复杂的相互作用和变化的不确定性。系统冲击理论在军事学中的应用也受到广泛关注。系统冲击理论的提出为军事学研究提供了新的视角和工具，有助于更好地理解现代战争的复杂性和不确定性。
cooperative security - but also of considerable disorder. Instead, the choices made by military planners and policy-makers will create an early twenty-first century story privileging nuclear stability or chaos. The US and Russia can, and should, make incremental progress in arms control and nonproliferation. This book will be much of interest to students of strategic studies, military science, US foreign policy, technology and war, and security studies.

**Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Enlarged Edition)**

**The Gideon Doctrine**

This book examines the latest thinking regarding Russia’s present position and its anticipated future by leading Russian philosophers, political scientists, economists, and cultural figures, to whom the author refers as “visionsaries.” These thinkers position Russia as a global protector of fairness and a safeguard against any single nation’s world hegemony. Despite Russians’ abiding tendency to understand and undervalue their achievements, they are increasingly coming to realize that Russia’s historical record is, on the whole, outstanding. The book’s 17 chapters, including many original translations of spoken discussions, argue that Russia has all the prerequisites for, and, in fact, already well on the way toward, becoming a global Noah’s Ark of Western civilization.

**Bringing Order to Chaos**

This book focuses on the evolution of nuclear weapons as components of US military strategy and arms control by contrasting their roles in the early and later information ages.

**Strategy for Chaos**

What is Soviet-American competition all about? Is the Soviet Union a security problem that the United States must solve? Or is it an insecurity condition with which the U.S. must learn to live – and if so, on what terms? What kind of a player is the United States in the great game of power politics? In The Geopolitics of Super Power, one of our most respected strategic theorists answers these and other questions. In geopolitical terms, Colin Gray sees the Soviet-American antagonism as an enduring contest between a continental empire and a maritime coalition, each with its distinctive character and purposes. Gray explores the roots of the American style in foreign policy and strategy, and how that style relates to defense options. He identifies four broad alternatives for U.S. national security policy: passive and active means of containment, disengagement from foreign security commitments, and the “rollback” of the Soviet empire. Gray argues vigorously for active containment, for the sustained emphasis of nuclear weapons, and for the intelligent use, for deterrence and defense purposes, of the West’s great competitive strengths in the political, economic, and technological spheres.

**The Geopolitics Of Super Power**

In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy works. The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategy, in which means that, of necessity, it is strategy. To the great RMA debate of the 1990s as strategy, he gives comprehensively, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court. The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.

**Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods**


**From Chaos to Cohesion**

**Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy**


**Nonlinear Science and Warfare**

The third in Robert Greene’s bestselling series is now available in a pocket sized concise edition. Following 48 Laws of Power and The Art of Seduction, here is a brilliant distillation of the strategies of war to help you wage triumphant battles everyday. Spanning world civilizations, and synthesizing dozens of political, philosophical, and religious texts. The Concise Strategies of War is a guide to the subtle social game of everyday life. Based on profound and timeless lessons, it is abundantly illustrated with examples of the genius and folly of everyone from Napoleon to Margaret Thatcher and Hannibal to Ulysses S. Grant, as well as diplomats, captains of industry and Samurai swordsmen.

**Strategic Chaos and Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan**

Let’s feel the world’s pulse: the emergence of the future Chinese leadership, the United States policy and the Arab world, the US military budget for 2011, the START treaty, the nuclear issues, Obama’s military policy and complexities of the relations between India and Pakistan, the Afghan Hindustan East peace process, the triangular alliance between India, Iran and Hezbollah, or the risks of war between Israel and Iran Through a dozen of political chronicles, the specialist Hanser Zumit outlines the main directions of international policies taken in 2010/2011. A brilliant worldwide view of the foreign strategies and new stances that picture tomorrow’s world.

**The 33 Strategies Of War**

The remit of this study is to encourage further studies that make an honest and successful effort to achieve synergy between social science and history when analysing the impact of revolutions in military affairs (RMAs).

**A Curriculum for Strategy in the Information Age**

The world stands on the threshold of a new era. The changes of 1989 have unmoored our national security strategy. At the center of the new strategic debate is the question of the Army’s participation in the strategic planning process. Many observers believe that the Army is too focused on ground warfare, that it is not ready to take the lead in the information age. To support that theme, this paper first projects a future war to help shape the Army’s military strategy. The Army must be prepared to face this future war and must shape the future war to its advantage. The conclusion of this study is to encourage further studies that make an honest and successful effort to achieve synergy between social science and history when analysing the impact of revolutions in military affairs (RMAs).

**Science, Strategy and War**

Piracy, wars, earthquakes, criminal organizations, drug cartels, apocalyptic religious extremists, police agencies, terrorists: these are classic insurgents whose past, present, and future is dissected in this important book. Contributing writers include Martha Crenshaw, T. X. Hammes, Russell Howard, Gene Cristy, Yosif Kuperwasser, and academics from Naval War College, Marine Corps War College, and Stanford University, explore important insurgency cases such as domestic terrorism, globalization of armed groups, on the battlefield, religious influence on armed fights, and more. This critical study offers scholars and students a new way to think about national and international security—as it stands today, and its future.

**Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency**

**Enemy Civilian Casualties**

The word “strategy” pervades American conversation and our news media and is most often used as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a “vision” of the direction in which to proceed in the personal, organizational, and governmental-local, state, or federal-levels. Such casual use of the term to describe something more than “what we would like to do next” is inappropriate and belies the complexity of national strategy and strategic thinking. This “little book” talks about big strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It is applicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monograph does not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides a framework for considering strategy and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. This “little book” talks about big strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It is applicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monograph does not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides a framework for considering strategy and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking.
Strategies and Trends in Organizational and Project Management

In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy 'works'. The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must 'work' as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court. The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, in World War I, and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is on the way these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.

Strategic Theory for the 21st Century

An informed modern plan for post-2020 American foreign policy that avoids the opposing dangers of retrenchment and overextension Russia and China are both believed to have "grand strategies"—detailed sets of national security goals backed by means, and plans, to pursue them. In the United States, policy makers have tried to articulate similar concepts but have failed to reach a widespread consensus since the Cold War ended. While the United States has been the world's prominent superpower for over a generation, much American thinking has oscillated between the extremes of isolationist agendas versus interventionist and overly assertive ones. Drawing on historical precedents and weighing issues such as Russia's resurgence, China's great rise, North Korea's nuclear machinations, and Middle East turmoil, Michael O'Hanlon presents a well-researched, ethically sound, and politically viable vision for American national security policy. He also proposes complementing the Pentagon's set of "4+1" pre-existing threats with a new "4+1": biological, nuclear, digital, climatic, and internal dangers.

Central Lewisham Area

From Chaos To Cohesion: A Regional Approach to Security, Stability, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Enlarged Edition)

Failure and folly are inevitable in war and in security policy related to war. Technology cannot rescue flawed policy or strategy. In his review of U.S. military strategy, Cimbala points to the possibility that excessive faith in technology may lead American strategy into a cul-de-sac.

Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security

#1 NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER • A clear-eyed account of learning how to lead in a chaotic world, by General Jim Mattis—the former Secretary of Defense and one of the most formidable strategic thinkers of our time—and Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and combat Marine. "A four-star general’s five-star memory."—The Wall Street Journal Call Sign Chaos is the account of Jim Mattis's storied career, from wide-ranging leadership roles in three wars to ultimately commanding a quarter of a million troops across the Middle East. Along the way, Mattis recounts his foundational experiences as a leader, extracting the lessons he has learned about the nature of warfighting and peacemaking, the importance of allies, and the strategic dilemmas—and short-sighted thinking—now facing our nation. He makes it clear why America must return to a strategic footing so as not to continue winning battles but fighting inconclusive wars. Gas—if it was used at all—played only a minor part won a grinding war of attrition through luck, persistence, and the use of poison gas. Instead, Iraq planned the last campaign almost two years prior to its unfolding. [The Iraqis] trained extensively and expended enormous sums of money to make their effort succeed. What won for them was their superior fighting prowess and greater commitment. Gas—if it was used at all—played only a minor part. The study centers around the last Iraqi campaign, which Pelletiere argues was based upon World War II blitzkrieg tactics, but he also treats the background, the politics, and the history of the conflict, and analyzes the significance of the war to the Middle East and to the position of the United States there.

Professional Journal of the United States Army

The Art of War in an Age of Peace

Call Sign Chaos

Catastrophic Possibilities Threatening U.S. Security

This book is a major reinterpretation of the Iran-Iraq War and is a source for reexamining the U.S. involvement in the Gulf. Pelletiere demonstrates that the war was not a standoff in which Iraq finally won a grueling war of attrition through luck, persistence, and the use of poison gas. Instead, Iraq planned the last campaign almost two years prior to its unfolding. [The Iraqis] trained extensively and expended enormous sums of money to make their effort succeed. What won for them was their superior fighting prowess and greater commitment. Gas—if it was used at all—played only a minor part. The study centers around the last Iraqi campaign, which Pelletiere argues was based upon World War II blitzkrieg tactics, but he also treats the background, the politics, and the history of the conflict, and analyzes the significance of the war to the Middle East and to the position of the United States there.

Strategic Leadership and Strategic Management

This book traces political, cultural, and technological aspects of the problem of enemy civilian casualties. By looking at the sociopolitical environment in the United States, Russia, and Israel, Ofer Fridman analyses the systematic failure of their military organizations to integrate technologies meant to minimize enemy civilian casualties.

Strategy for Chaos

Indefensible Space explores the increasing envelopment of public space and life by an architecture of security/paranoia. From the most literal level, barriers in front of buildings, to more abstract levels, enhanced surveillance of public spaces.